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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine whether greater international trade, democracy and reduced military 
spending lower belligerence between India and Pakistan. Conflict between the two 
nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework where variables such 
as economic performance, multilateral trade with the rest of the world, bilateral 
trade, military expenditure, democracy scores and population are simultaneously 
taken into account. Our empirical investigation based on time series econometrics 
from 1950-2005, allowing us to truly address causality, suggests that reduced 
bilateral trade, greater military expenditure, less development expenditure, lower 
levels of democracy, lower growth rates and less general trade openness are all 
conflict enhancing, albeit with lags in some cases. Moreover, there is reverse 
causality between bilateral trade, militarization and conflict; low levels of bilateral 
trade and high militarization are conflict enhancing, equally conflict also reduces 
bilateral trade and raises militarization. Economic growth is conflict mitigating, but 
the reverse is not true. Globalization, or a greater openness to trade with the rest 
of the world, is the most significant driver of a liberal peace, corroborating a 
modified form of the capitalist peace, rather than a common democratic political 
orientation suggested by the pure form of the Kantian liberal peace.  
 
Word Count: 10, 117 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examines inter-state hostility between India and Pakistan, which 
is arguably one of the most prominent inter-state conflicts still extant, whose 
saliency is highlighted by the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides. 
Conflict reduction is also necessary if the region is to release resources from 
military expenditure for poverty reduction. We analyse some of the factors 
that might lead to conflict abatement between these long standing rivals, 
including the role of trade and a mutually democratic orientation. In doing so, 
we hope to utilise this important case of bilateral inter-state conflict to shed 
some light on the voluminous liberal peace literature. 
 
India and Pakistan emerged as separate nation states in August 1947, when 
British India was partitioned following independence from colonial rule. 
Latterly, in 1971, the Eastern wing of Pakistan separated to become 
Bangladesh. In many ways, India and Pakistan share a common heritage, 
including overlapping languages and ethnicities, as two major provinces of 
British India were split up in the partition process (Punjab and Bengal). The 
ostensibly differentiating factor is religion; although Pakistan is 
predominantly Muslim, up to 10% of India’s population continues to be 
Muslim, and as much as 15% of Bangladesh’s population is non-Muslim. 
  
The hostility between India and Pakistan dates back to the very inception of 
these countries as independent states. They have had six wars or fatal 
conflicts; three over the disputed territory of Kashmir in 1947-48, 1965 and 
1999, the Rann of Kutch in 1965, one in connection with the secession of 
Bangladesh in 1971, and sporadic fighting over the uncharted Siachen 
Glaciers in the 1980s. The territorial dispute over Kashmir remains 
unresolved. Even when they are not engaged in outright war, Indian and 
Pakistani troops confront each other every day, with fingers literally on the 
trigger, along the ceasefire line or line of control established on 1st January 
1949 in Kashmir. India also unilaterally amassed troops more generally 
along the Pakistan border in 1951 and 2002. India has, with considerable 
justification, accused Pakistan of fomenting, aiding and abetting the 
insurgency in Indian Kashmir since 1989, and wider acts of terrorism inside 
India (with less justification). India is not a signatory to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, and Pakistan refuses to become party to this agreement 
unless India does. Both nations have a long history of accusing each other of 
espionage and sabotage. Despite these hostilities there are a few hopeful 
signs. India and Pakistan successfully resolved any potential riparian 
disputes over the Indus in 1960. They do engage in talks, make occasional 
goodwill gestures involving travel links, and regularly engage in sporting 
exchanges, especially cricket tours.     
 
Any search for the seeds of conflict between these two countries will stress 
the saliency of the Kashmir territorial dispute.1 Kashmir was not directly ruled 
by the British, but was a quasi-autonomous princely state with a Hindu 
                                                
1
 The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s ancestry is from Kashmir, and in the 
acronymous version of the name Pakistan the letter K denotes Kashmir, originally conceived 
by a Cambridge undergraduate Choudhary Rahmat Ali in 1933.  
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prince ruling over a predominantly Muslim population. The partition plan 
allowed princely states to opt for either India or Pakistan. While not a single 
princely state with a Hindu population was permitted to join Pakistan, the 
Hindu ruler of Kashmir was persuaded to accede to India; see Korbel (1954). 
This angered many, including tribesmen in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier 
Province alongside Afghanistan. The tribal incursion into Kashmir led to a 
response by the regular Indian army, and later irregular and regular 
Pakistani forces were drawn into the fray. The rest is history, but the majority 
of Kashmir is in India (including the Kashmir valley) and Pakistan controls 
the smaller and more rugged mountainous chunk of Kashmir. The UN 
brokered ceasefire of 1949, which is still the de facto frontier at present, 
envisaged a plebiscite to determine the fate of Kashmir, but it has never 
been implemented due to Indian reservations. 
 
But besides this seemingly irresolvable territorial dispute, there are other 
historical and cultural factors that have made the people of these two 
countries grow apart. These processes are embedded in the undivided 
Indian nationalist struggle for self-government. Following the formation of the 
Indian National Congress in 1885, another organisation, the Muslim League 
appeared in 1906, dividing the nationalist movement along sectarian lines 
(Wolpert, 2002). While many Muslims continued, and still continue, to be 
members of the Congress the real dispute between the two communities 
(the Hindu majority and the sizeable Muslim minority) was over the federal or 
con-federal nature of a self-governing India. As is well known, a Westminster 
style unitary or majoritarian electoral system, can under-represent a sizeable 
minority (as in the case of Catholics in Northern Ireland from 1922 down to 
the dissolution of the Stormont Parliament in 1972), as well as stifling 
regional autonomy. The Congress’s obduracy over this issue caused Jinnah 
(the founder of Pakistan) to seek a different political path; see Wolpert 
(2002). Even as late as 1946, the Cabinet Mission plan for a future 
independent India conceived a federation of three largely autonomous states 
with only three common areas of federal competence: defence, currency and 
foreign affairs; see Wolpert (2002). This formulation was accepted by Jinnah 
and his Muslim League, but rejected by the Congress led by Nehru who 
favoured a unitary majoritarian system. Secondly, we have the trauma of 
partition in 1947. Both the Indian and Pakistani Punjab were ethnically 
cleansed; some 6 million refugees were forced to flee the Indian Punjab to 
Pakistan and similarly 4 million people from the other side (Moon, 1962). At 
least half a million (but more likely a million) died in the violence associated 
with the partition of the Punjab province alone, something that has prompted 
many writers, including Wolpert (2006) to describe it as an act of stupendous 
mismanagement by the colonial administration.  Thirdly, the language that 
was common to all communities in Northern India, has grown, and is still 
growing, apart since the late 19th century. What used to be Hindustani has 
gradually metamorphosised into Urdu for Muslims and Hindi for non-
Muslims. Finally, the draconian consular practices of the two countries inhibit 
travel and cultural exchange, despite the much vaunted cricket tours. 
Initially, the two countries shared a common currency and no visas were 
required for travel. Prior to the advent of satellite television films or music in 
common or commonly understood languages could not be viewed in the 
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other country except through clandestine means. There is little in terms of 
rail and air links between the two nations that promote peaceful networks 
(Gleditsch, 1967).               
 
Figure 1: Patterns in India-Pakistan Trade  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can trade mitigate the conflict between these two populous South Asian 
nations? Polachek (1997) and Polachek & Seiglie (2006) argue that wars 
and disputes between geographically contiguous states involve substantial 
losses, as more efficient geographically proximate trade is displaced.2  
Similarly, the absence of trade is also conflict enhancing for neighbours. 
Robst, Polachek & Chang (2007) demonstrate that geographical proximity 
has a greater conflict enhancing effect when two nations do not trade much, 
as is the case with India and Pakistan. Figure 1 shows that India-Pakistan 
official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s total international trade) steadily 
declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, plummeting to almost zero after 
their war in 1965, and has shown some signs of recovery in the 1990s. But it 
is still below the levels of the 1950s, which was shortly after the two nations 
were separated politically. This is despite the fact that both India and 
Pakistan are increasingly more open economies (figure 2), with Pakistan 
being historically the more trade dependent economy.  
 
Figure 2: Openness for Pakistan and India 
 
                                                
2
 When we come to comparing trade and conflict with many nations, not just dyadic (pair-
wise) interactions, Dorussen and Hegre (2003) argue that although trade reduces conflict, in 
the presence of many countries, an increase in the number of countries or the world’s 
endowment may induce more conflict, as there are more countries to grab from.  
  
India-Pakistan—Trade and Conflict   
 4 
 Pakistan and Indian Defence Expenditures as a ratio 
of  their respective GDPs 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
Pdg
Idg
 
Secondly, can a more common polity based on democratic values mitigate 
conflict between these two countries? India has always had one of the 
highest democracy scores in the developing world (scoring 7-9 out of 10), 
whereas Pakistan’s experience with democracy varies, because of military 
coups in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999. Figure 3 illustrates large military 
expenditures in the two countries, with an understandably greater military 
burden for the smaller country, Pakistan. These two countries have some of 
the highest military burdens in the world outside the Middle East (World 
Development Indicators, 2006).  
 
The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to higher 
stages of economic development (Gartzke, 2007). The 1990s is considered 
to be a golden decade for India as on an average the Indian economy grew 
at 5-6% annually. Despite a relatively high democracy score in Pakistan up 
to 1999, conflict between the countries escalated in the 1990s. By contrast, 
the recent regime in Pakistan with a strong military orientation made major 
unilateral concessions to India vis-à-vis their long standing disputes over 
Kashmir. If anything, conflict between the two nations can be best 
understood in a multivariate framework where the relevant variables and 
processes (economic performance, integration with rest of the world, 
bilateral trade, military expenditure, democracy and population) are 
simultaneously taken into account. We also investigate the causal links 
between bilateral conflict and these variables in a time series framework.  
 
 
Figure 3: Defence Spending as a Proportion of GDP in India and Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: the next section contains a brief 
review of the liberal peace literature, followed by a theoretical model of 
strategic interaction preceding our empirical analysis and a brief conclusion.    
 
THE LIBERAL PEACE 
 
Nation states have long been regarded to exist in a state of non-contractual 
anarchy vis-à-vis each other, making the exercise of power or the gathering 
of power by war an opportunistic act. Yet there are beliefs that common 
values, and/or inter-state commerce will moderate or eradicate these war-
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like tendencies; see Doyle (1986) and Oneal and Russet (1997), for 
example. These views of the liberal peace, in turn, may be sub-divided into 
two types of theories: one set emphasising common norms between nation 
states (with democracy at the kernel of these shared beliefs), and another 
highlighting that conflict or war seriously disrupts international trade, thereby 
reducing the gains from trade, and thus inducing a rational leadership to 
eschew war. The former notion is more idealistic, and the latter idea is 
predicated upon a rational calculus of the opportunity costs of lost trade.     
 
The idealist version of the liberal peace can be traced back to Immanuel 
Kant, who in his essay on the Perpetual Peace (1795) argues that although 
war is the natural state of man, peace can be established through deliberate 
design. This requires the adoption of a republican constitution 
simultaneously by all nations, which inter alia would check the war-like 
tendencies of monarchs and the citizenry; the cosmopolitanism that would 
emerge among the comity of nations would preclude war. Additionally, 
commerce between nations would grease the machinery that keeps the 
peace.3 We may refer to this strand of the liberal peace, where trade plays 
only an indirect role, as the ‘Kantian’ peace. So do democracies never fight 
each other? There are the assertions of some, for example Gartzke (2007) 
who argues that: “Democracy cohabitates with peace. It does not, by itself, 
lead nations to be less conflict prone, not even toward other democracies”, 
(Gartzke, 2007: 170). Mansfield and Snyder (2005) have argued that the 
road to democracy for countries at an early stage in the democratisation 
process may contribute to the risk of conflict. This is because national 
sentiments may rise to the fore in the presence of weak institutions. This 
may apply to Pakistan, and even to India given its widespread poverty.   
 
The second liberal view that trade between nations directly contributes to the 
peace can be related to the Baron de Montesquieu’s, Spirit of the Laws 
(1748), where he states that commerce tends to promote peace between 
nations; mutual self-interest precludes war; trade also softens attitudes of 
peoples towards each other. The analogy of these views with contemporary 
neo-classical economic theory is that trade reproduces the integrated 
economy. Free trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework leads to product and 
factor price equalization, hence producing economic integration, even if 
nation states continue to be politically separated. Polachek (1980) found that 
nations with the greatest amount of trade were least hostile to each other, 
and a doubling of trade would lead to a 20% decline in hostility.  
 
The trouble with the pacific interpretation of international trade is that during 
the two world wars of the 20th century, highly interdependent economies 
went to total war with each other. Consequently, the economic 
interdependence argument for peace needs nuancing. There is, indeed, 
                                                
3
 Interestingly, Kant (1795) argued that such arrangements between nations might exclude 
distant lands, and aggressive wars, such as those associated with colonialism, might be 
waged against peoples deemed to be outside the pale of civilization. A similar point has been 
recently made by Gartzke (2007) in a different context where development and common 
goals precludes wars between countries at a similar level of development, but makes wars 
with distant countries at a lower level of development more likely.   
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considerable debate on the empirical validity of the opportunity costs of lost 
gains from trade deterring inter-state conflict. As with Polachek (1980, 1997), 
Oneal and Russett (1999) show that trade and peace are highly correlated. 
While all analysts agree that war impedes trade, the realist view is that 
countries may choose to disrupt their potential enemy’s gains from trade by 
ceasing trade with them, even if this means hostilities. There are also 
instances of nations trading even when there are at war. Barbieri & Levy 
(1999), using an interrupted time series framework found little impact of war 
on trading relationships for 7 dyads from 1870. They argue that any 
disruption to bilateral trade caused by war is, in many instances, remedied 
after peace emerges. Both trade and war produce winners and losers. Even 
if there are losses to the aggregate economy from war or diminished trade, 
some groups may gain, and these groups may be the more politically 
influential. These results were disputed by Anderton and Carter (2001). Kim 
& Rousseau (2005) emphasise the simultaneity problem or reverse causality 
running between economic interdependence and conflict; instrumenting for 
this difficulty on data for 1960-88 they find that conflict diminishes economic 
interdependence, but not the other way around, providing only partial 
support for the opportunity cost of trade liberal peace theory. Keshk, Pollins 
& Reuveny (2004) also come up with a similar finding. Other factors, besides 
trade, may be at work. 
 
Hegre (2000) points out that economic interdependence reinforces peace, 
but between more developed economies. Russet and Oneal (2001) argue 
that it is the economic dependence on trade of the least dependent on the 
other member of a pair of nations that will determine the pacific effect of 
trade. In the same spirit, Martin, Mayer & Thoenig (2008) argue both 
theoretically and empirically that it is the potential disruption to a high degree 
of bilateral trade dependence, rather than their general exposure to 
multilateral trade that is conflict abating. Their theoretical model, however, 
emphasises the presence of asymmetric information in producing war.   
 
Among the updates proposed to the liberal peace theory based on economic 
interdependence is the ‘capitalist’ peace notion of Gartzke (2007) where the 
notion of interdependence is nuanced and the saliency of international trade 
in goods and services minimised. He argues that the intensity of trade is the 
least important feature in the peace engendered by modern capitalism, 
although McDonald (2004) demonstrates that it is not just the trade intensity 
between nations, but a commitment to the policy of free trade, that may 
promote the liberal peace as it serves to dampen domestic protectionist and 
pro-war interests, as will be demonstrated by our analysis. The nature of 
advanced capitalism makes territorial disputes, which are mainly contests 
over resources, less likely as the market mechanism allows easier access to 
resources. The nature of production makes the output of more sophisticated 
goods and services increasingly reliant on ‘ideas’ that are research and 
development intensive, and skilled personnel can be acquired through more 
open global labour markets. Moreover, the disruption to integrated financial 
markets makes war less likely between countries caught up in that web of 
interdependence. We might also add the fragmented nature of production 
with components produced in different international locations. Much of world 
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trade is trade in components between the same multi-national firms across 
national borders. Gartzke (2007) argues that common foreign policy goals 
reflected in the membership of international treaty organisations also 
produce peace; a point also made by Dorussen & Ward (2008), except that 
they emphasise indirect network links. There is little in terms of financial and 
investment flows between India and Pakistan ruling out this aspect of the 
capitalist peace in their case. Moreover, the Kashmir territorial dispute is not 
about resources. There is, however, less foreign policy divergence now as 
compared to the past. India under Nehru (1947-64) veered towards the non-
aligned movement, and was closer to the Soviet Union in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s, from whom it obtained concessionary military assistance. 
Pakistan, by contrast, was a member of the long defunct military pacts such 
as the Baghdad Pact or CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) and SEATO 
(South East Asian Treaty Organisation) during the height of the cold war, 
and the USA showed some favour to Pakistan and gave it some military aid 
during the late 1950s, early 1960s and 1980s. Pakistan also moved closer to 
its enemy’s enemy, China in the mid-1960s, when India had a serious border 
dispute with China. The Soviet Union is long gone, there has been 
rapprochement between India and China, and the USA might be seen to 
view both Pakistan and India as allies in its war on global terror, even if it is 
less wary of India’s nuclear power. In the light of Maoz et. Al (2006) even if 
ethnic affinity between India and Pakistan has steadily declined for over a 
century; external policy divergence has probably diminished recently.   
 
In short, only advanced and highly economically inter-dependent 
democracies would be at peace with one another, which possibly precludes 
developing countries like India and Pakistan. Dorussen & Ward (2009), 
however, rehabilitate the role of trade in producing peace through a novel 
channel. They argue that trade has important indirect effects over and above 
the interdependence induced by bilateral trade. Increased trade generally, 
may do little to mollify war-like tendencies between a pair of countries, but if 
each of these countries interacts considerably with third countries, it will be 
not in their interests to go to war with each other, as it disrupts other links 
and networks. In other words, any two countries are unlikely to go to war 
with each other if there trade with the rest of the world is substantial even 
when their bilateral trade dependence is low. They label this phenomenon as 
mutual dependence; although our formulation based on general openness is 
different to theirs it will have a key role to play in our results. Figure 1 above 
shows the insignificant levels of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan, 
but figure 2 demonstrates their increasing exposure to world trade.           
 
THE COST OF PEACEFUL ACTIONS: STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
 
In this section we model the political costs of peace, entailing concessions to 
one’s adversaries. Additionally, we try to demonstrate how increased 
globalization (opportunity costs of lost trade) or democratisation (the Kantian 
peace) can help abate conflict by lowering the cost of making concessions to 
one’s neighbours. This corresponds closely to the two schools of thought 
regarding the liberal peace. To analyse these factors we require a two 
country expected utility model of non-cooperative strategic interaction.  
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The two countries: India and Pakistan are indexed by subscripts I for India 
and P for Pakistan. There are two states of nature, denoted by superscripts: 
one more peaceful or dovish (D), and the other associated with greater 
hawkishness (H). Their probabilities are defined as pi and 1 - pi, respectively. 
The probability of either state is in turn affected by actions and efforts; (a) for 
India and (e) for Pakistan. These are also the strategic variables employed by 
the two sides to the conflict. We postulate that the probability of the peaceful 
state pi rises with the input of action and effort by the two sides, but at 
diminishing rates. One can imagine a range of activities by one or both sides if 
they wish to promote peace, including a greater willingness to compromise, 
reduce military expenditure, devoting more resources to peaceful economic 
development, or a greater willingness to respond to calls for peace by third-
parties such as the UN and the United States.  
 
Actions and efforts to seek peace entail costs for each party. The costs of 
actions to promote peace could take a variety of forms, but, above all, there is 
the loss of face to either party’s hawkish domestic political constituencies, 
including the military establishment and extremist political parties in both 
countries. Increased globalization may, however, augment the stock of 
rhetoric available to politicians who wish to push their ‘peace’ agenda through 
the political process. Secondly, and in a more palpable sense, increased 
international trade and the growth it brings may provide the additional 
resources to buy off domestic ‘war’ lobbies. A more democratic government, 
following military rule, may similarly use its mandate from the people to justify 
greater peace and reduced military expenditure.      
 
The expected utility of India is given by 
 
))(()(),)(1()(),( TaZSEUeaSEUeaU HIHIHIDIDIDII −+−++= pipi   (1) 
 
Where I
DU and I
HU denote utilities or pay-offs in dovish and hawkish states 
respectively, weighted by the probabilities of the two states. 
D
I
D
I SE + , 
H
I
H
I SE + indicate the exogenous pair of payoffs from consumption and 
security expenditure respectively in the less belligerent and more belligerent 
states respectively. The difference is that in dovish state security spending is 
lower and private consumption higher than in the hawkish state. There will 
also be more trade between the two countries. Most importantly, the dovish 
state of nature will imply greater poverty reduction. Z is the cost function of 
undertaking the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace,pi, 
however, undertaking it entails a cost, as described above. T indicates greater 
globalization (more trade with the rest of the world), and this is postulated to 
reduce the cost of making peace via the cost function (Z) as discussed above, 
Za1 < 0. Also, pia > 0, but piaa < 0; there are diminishing returns to these actions. 
However, both Za > 0 and Zaa > 0.  
 
Turning to Pakistan, we symmetrically have 
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)),(()(),)(1()(),( PTeLSEUeaSEUeaU HPHPHIDPDPDPP −+−++= pipi  (2) 
 
L is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, pi. As with 
India, greater globalization lowers the marginal cost of making peaceful 
concessions, but so does a hybrid concept called increased democratisation 
(P) for Pakistan only given the nature of swings there between democratically 
elected governments and military rule; Le1 and Le2 < 0. Also, pie > 0, but piee < 
0, Le > 0, and Lee > 0.  
 
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash game each side maximises its own 
utility function with respect to its own choice variable. For India, it implies 
maximising utility, Equation (1), with respect to a as shown by 
 [ ] aHIDIa ZUU =⋅−⋅ )()(pi         (3) 
 
Pakistan maximises Equation (2) with respect to e 
 [ ] eHPDPe LUU =⋅−⋅ )()(pi         (4) 
 
Note that in Equations (3) and (4) each side will equate its marginal benefit 
from peaceful behaviour to the corresponding marginal cost.  
 
A number of factors could lead to greater peaceful action and less conflict. 
First, greater globalisation or a greater commitment to free trade (McDonald, 
2004) and/or an increase in bilateral trade (a rise in T) because of, say, the 
establishment of a free trade area, and increased international (not 
necessarily just bilateral) trade lower the marginal cost of peaceful behaviour 
(Za1, Le1< 0). Analytically this means a change in the first-order conditions for 
both India and Pakistan to:  [ ] dTZUU aHIDIa 1)()( =⋅−⋅pi         (5) 
 [ ] dTLUU eHPDPe 1)()( =⋅−⋅pi         (6) 
 
This pertains to the trade effects of the liberal peace. Alternatively, there could 
be a rise in the exogenous pay-offs in terms of consumption expenditure (E) 
due to increased growth, in (1) and (2) above, leading to a similar outcome, 
but this time increasing the marginal benefits of peaceful action on the right-
hand sides of (5) and (6).  The costs of peaceful actions may be easier to bear 
when countries (in this case only Pakistan) are more democratic, as there 
may be a mandate from the people to engage in more poverty reduction, 
greater social sector spending and lower military expenditure. This 
corresponds to the purer form of the Kantian peace and will cause the first 
order condition for Pakistan to become:  [ ] dPLUU eHPDPe 2)()( =⋅−⋅pi        (7) 
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This will raise the level of peaceful effort exercised by Pakistan, but not by 
India if the two strategies are substitutes. This could be argued to be the case 
at present. As India moves closer to the United States, and with the latter’s 
global war on terror, more pressure is exerted on Pakistan to make unilateral 
concessions towards India since 2001. We could even argue that India is free 
riding on Pakistan. 
      
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1: Greater bilateral inter-state commerce between India and Pakistan, as 
well as greater multilateral trade with third countries lowers various forms of 
bilateral inter-state conflict. This corresponds to the version of the liberal 
peace that stresses the opportunity cost of lost trade due to hostilities. This 
hypothesis follows from our literature review and the theoretical model above. 
Note the right-hand sides of (5) and (6) above, where an increase in 
globalization or bilateral trade (T) lowers the marginal cost of peaceful 
behaviour for both countries.  
H2: More military spending as a result of heightened insecurity raises conflict 
or because of the processes described by Mansfield and Snyder (2005); the 
democratic transition may enhance nationalism and militarization. The 
marginal utility of security spending rises; indicated by a decline in the 
marginal benefit of peaceful behaviour on the left-hand side of (3) and (4). 
H3: Development expenditure (such as public spending on education) should 
lower conflict, because of economic growth which enables more consumption 
in equations (1) and (2), as the pay-offs in general consumption increase, 
particularly in the peaceful state.  
H4: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict; via the capitalist peace type 
arguments (Gartzke, 2007). This raises utility, as consumption rises in (1) and 
(2), and the potential marginal utility of peaceful behaviour in (3)-(7).  
H5: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict, related to 
the pure form of the ‘Kantian’ peace. Increased democracy may lower the cost 
of compromise with former enemies, as in (7) where it leads to a fall in the 
marginal cost of compromise. 
 
Data:  
Since inter-state conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic concept. 
We construct dyadic proxies for India-Pakistan inter-state trade, military 
burden, development expenditure, economic development and democracy to 
test the five hypotheses above. Full data definitions and sources are given in 
the web appendix. 
Since we are interested in the evolution of India-Pakistan conflict over a 
period of the last 55 years, we will use Uppsala/PRIO and Correlates of War 
Project (COW) inter-state war data set (Jones et al, 1996; Ghosn et al, 2004) 
instead of events based data sets. Events data is not available for the entire 
period. Also, our macroeconomic and democracy data varies annually which 
limits the use of daily events information.  
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Generally dyadic trade is captured by sum of imports and exports between 
actor and target countries (Polachek & Seglie, 2006). We construct a 
composite measure of India-Pakistan trade by taking Pakistan’s total trade 
with India as percentage of Pakistan’s total trade.(Tpitp). We expect the 
bilateral trade proxy to be negatively related with conflict.  If trade reduces 
conflict, trade with more countries should reduce conflict even more. Thus, it 
is important to investigate how more trade with the rest of the world affects 
India-Pakistan hostilities. We construct 4 dyadic proxies to measure trade 
dependence (see table 1).  
Above discussion shows that both countries incur high levels of military 
spending which means that average effect of military expenditures of both 
countries on Conflict would be positive. However, military expenditures can 
reflect hostility, as well as deterrence (Polachek & Seglie, 2006) and thus may 
also be considered as assets.  Thus we would also like to examine country 
specific dynamics of military spending to find out how each country’s military 
expenditure/ military burden affects the dispute. We already know that 
Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher 
than India’s (figure 3). Additionally, since military expenditures may also 
capture the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state 
conflict, Indian military expenditure can also be explained in terms of the high 
prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India. 
Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military 
burden captures its security concerns vis-à-vis India solely. Thus to go beyond  
average dyadic investigation of the effect of military burden on conflict, we 
utilize 2 dynamic proxies of military burden which take military expenditure of 
Pakistan as a ratio of Indian military expenditure (Lmilbrd2) and the inverse 
(Lmilbrd3) in addition to taking average of India and Pakistan’s military 
expenditures (Lmilbrd1). The last two proxies of military burden capture the 
dynamic interaction between India and Pakistan’s military expenditure. If, as 
we suggest, Pakistan’s military burden is more closely related to conflict than 
the Indian one, Lmilbrd2 would have a positive sign and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) 
should have a negative sign, thus showing denominator effect of the inverse.   
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan, we turn to the Polity IV 
project at the Center for Systemic Peace at George Mason University. Polity 
IV computes a combined polity score by subtracting autocracy scores from the 
democracy scores for the corresponding year. The value of this Polity score 
ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 
the maximum democracy score. Although India always takes a high positive 
value of 7 or above, Pakistan frequently takes on negative values. We 
construct a dyadic variable of democracy for both countries by combining 
(multiplying) their Polity scores, following Polachek & Seiglie (2006). We add 
10 to each countries polity series to make the negative Polity values positive 
so that our combined democracy score may capture the variations in the 
democratization process only on a positive scale. The dyadic democracy 
variable shows values as low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when there are 
high levels of political dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) and India 
(democracy), and as high as 350 when both countries are governed by 
democracies.  
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We take the weighted average of India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita 
growth rates (Gpi) as the dyadic proxy of economic progress for both 
countries. We constructed the series for both countries by dividing GDP at 
constant prices taken from economic surveys, and dividing it by population 
levels. The data was later tallied with GDP per capita series available at the 
World Development Indicators (2006) data set. We also constructed a proxy 
for social development based on India and Pakistan’s education data4. India 
(over 1 billion) and Pakistan (160 million) are one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world. In line with the earlier literature, we also take 
the average of both countries populations as a standardising variable in our 
analysis (Polachek, 1997).  
 
Methodology: 
 
As we can see, the data set is purely time series which may mean that most 
of the variables may suffer from random walk. Generally that is the case with 
most time series.  If a regression employs non stationary or a mix of stationary 
and non-stationary variables, the error term would suffer from autocorrelation 
which would in turn mean that the error term obtained from such a regression 
would also be non stationary. Generally, non-stationarity in variables may be 
solved by taking first difference of the series. How ever, it is not necessary to 
always take first difference and stationary may be achieved at level by taking 
time lags of variables where time trends or random walk would not be 
observed anymore.   
 
In our case, we have taken dyadic proxies, and thus the problem of random 
walk may have been minimised and we may obtain stationarity for our 
variables at level rather than first differences.   Table 1, undertakes unit root 
analysis to test for stationarity in the dyadic variables under modified or 
augmented  Dickey-Fuller t test (DF-GLS) proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg & 
Stock (1996) where each series is transformed via a generalised least 
squares (GLS) regression before performing the test. The results show that 
we could effectively solve for unit-root (random walk) at levels. Though for 
some variables, we could only obtain stationarity after quite a number of lags. 
For-example, Tpitp (Figure 1) clearly suffers from random walk for the periods 
between 1950 and 1970, whereas in comparison for most other variables 
presence of random walk is only observed in a smaller part of the series and 
only for smaller time periods. In case of Tpitp,as expected, taking lags up to 
15 solve for random walk. In other words, the stationary series for Tpitp would 
now consider periods after 1965 when there is a clear break in the random 
walk. In contrast, the economic development variable capturing the dyadic 
growth rates for India and Pakistan (Gpi) has been observed to be a perfectly 
stationary series (figure 4). Unit-root test confirms this observation as 
stationarity is achieved at level with 0 lags.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
4
 There is an insufficiently long time series for public health spending data for India.  
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Figure 4: Pakistan and India’s Dyadic Growth Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though we have solved for unit-root for all dyadic variables (see table 1), any 
simple least square regression analysis may still lead to spurious results due 
to the endogeneity problems among most variables (from trade, military 
expenditure and growth to conflict and vice-versa). We need to utilize a 
simultaneous equation model where potential endogeneities are addressed. 
Since our data is time series, we will use Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) 
which is an extension of univariate autoregressive (AR) models to capture the 
evolution and the interdependencies between our multiple time series (Sims, 
1980).   
Our reduced form general VAR model for conflict is as follows: 
)8(87,6,5,4,3,21 tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf εαααααααα ++++++++= −−−−−−−−−−   
Where tConf , itTr − , itMil − , itE − , itG − , tDemo and tP depict inter-state conflict, 
bilateral or multilateral trade, military burden, education expenditure, real 
growth rate of GDP per capita, dyadic democracy scores and population 
respectively; t ranges from 1950-2005 and pi ,....,1= . Here p is the optimal lag 
structure for the VAR model. it−,2α it−,3α it−,4α it−,5α and it−,6α are the coefficients 
respectively. Proxies for conflict, bilateral and multilateral trade, economic 
progress, military burden and social development will be treated as potentially 
endogenous, whereas dyadic democracy and population will be viewed as 
purely exogenous concepts. 
All variables in a VAR are treated symmetrically by including for each variable 
an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags, and the lags of 
other variables in the model. The number of equations in a VAR model 
depends upon the number of endogenous variables; each endogenous 
variable is regressed on its lagged value, and the lagged values of all other 
endogenous variables as well as any number of exogenous variables. This 
solves the problem of endogeneity among variables. In this sense VAR model 
is just a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with lagged variables 
and/or deterministic terms as common regressors, so that the regression 
results for each equation can be interpreted in the same manner as we do for 
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ordinary least square estimators. After fitting a VAR we may want to know 
which way causalities run.  Before we run VAR, we have to choose optimal 
lag structure for each regression specification to determine the exact lag 
length required for each endogenous dependent and endogenous 
independent variable to solve for endogeniety. In other words choice of 
optimal lag length is the identification test of each regression model, when 
endogenous variables are perfectly identified. 
 
 
Table 1 DF-GLS Unit Root Tests  
Variables  Lag length With intercept 
With intercept and 
trend 
Fatal (annual fatality levels, 0-6) 1 -3.528***(Ng-Perron) -3.774*** (Ng-Perron) 
Volfatal (precise numbers) 1 -4.789*** (Ng-Perron) -4.844*** (Ng-Perron) 
Dur (days of conflict) 1 -4.058*** (Ng-Perron) -4.233*** (Ng-Perron) 
Hiact (highest action in disputes) 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron) 
Hstlev (annual hostility levels, 1-5) 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512  (Ng-Perron)  
Cnf (conflict intensity ranges given by the 
PRIO-Uppsala data set) 1 -3.025*** (Ng-Perron) -4.082***  (Ng-Perron) 
Tpitp (Pakistan-India bilateral trade as a 
proportion of Pakistan’s trade) 15 -1.112* (Ng-Perron) -1.861  (Ng-Perron) 
Xmpi (Pakistan’s total global trade as a 
ratio of India’s global trade) 2 -2.710*** (Ng-Perron) -2.860* (Ng-Perron) 
Xmip (inverse of the above) 8 -4.951***  (MAIC) -4.923***   (MAIC) 
Lxpi (Log mean of Pakistan’s total exports 
over Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total 
exports over India’s GDP)  
0 -4.769*** (SIC) -4.929*** (SIC) 
Lmpi (Log mean of Pakistan’s total 
imports as a proportion of Pakistan’s GDP 
and India’s total imports as a ratio of 
India’s GDP) 
1 -4.511*** (SIC) -4.382*** (SIC) 
Lmilbrd1 (Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s defence 
expenditures) 
0 - -4.308*** (SIC) 
Lmilbrd2 (Log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure 
over Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP) 
5 -1.911* (Ng-Perron) -2.686* (Ng-Perron) 
Lmilbrd3 (Log of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP as a ratio of 
Pakistan’s defence expenditure over 
Pakistan’s GDP plus India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP) 
5 -2.128* (Ng-Perron) -2.831* (Ng-Perron) 
Ledupi (log GDP weighted average of per 
capita education expenditure in India and 
Pakistan) 
1  - -5.374*** (SIC) 
Gpi (weighted average of GDP per capita 
growth rates for both countries) 0 -4.256*** (Ng-Perron) -4.276*** (Ng-Perron) 
Demopi (Combined Democracy score of 
India and Pakistan) 7 -2.790*** (Ng-Perron) -2.997*** (Ng-Perron) 
Poppi (Average of India and Pakistan’s 
total population) 10 - -7.392*** (MAIC) 
-***, ** and * shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level respectively 
-  The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng-Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum Schwarz information 
criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) Dickey-Fuller test (D-Fuller).  
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Results:  
 
Table 2 
 
VAR Regression Equations for Fatal under Multiple Specifications for Trade 
 
 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 
Bilateral Trade 
     
Tpitp (16) -0.23**     
Mutilateral Trade 
     
Xmpi(3) 
 -0.77*    
Xmip (9) 
  -2.68***   
Lxpi2(1) 
   -4.78***  
Lmpi2(2) 
    -0.33 
Military Burde   
     
Lmilbrd1 (1) 3.26* 3.38** 2.26* 2.42* 3.09** 
Social Development 
     
Ledupi (2) -8.34*** -8.07*** -7.70*** -7.02*** -8.43*** 
Economic Growth 
     
Gpi (1) -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.33*** 
Exogenous Variables 
     
Demopi (8) -0.004* -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.005*** 
Poppi (11) 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 
     
N 38 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.61 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.44 
VAR(p) VAR[2] VAR[1] VAR(1) VAR[1] VAR[1] 
-***, ** and * shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level respectively 
- VAR[p] reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan & Quinn information criterion (HQIC), 
 
The most appropriate proxy and the one which is most closely linked to 
conflict (or its severity) is number of deaths. Thus VAR equation 8 is first run 
for the number of fatalities, Fatal. Table 2 shows the results for different 
measure of trade with average of India and Pakistan’s military burden 
(Milbrd1). Result on bilateral trade share (Tpitp) suggests that trade between 
Pakistan and India is negatively related with conflict. However, the low values 
of it−,3α coefficients suggest that bilateral trade has a limited role to play in 
conflict mitigation.  Though low trade levels between both countries may very 
well be the cause of the ongoing conflict because right after 1965 war the 
bilateral trade figures plummeted to near zero, here we do not need to worry 
about reverse causality because our VAR model takes care of potential 
endogeneity problems between Fatal and Tpitp. On the other hand, Lmilbrd1, 
is positively related with conflict and the relationship is significant. Military 
expenditures on average do not have deterrent effect (in terms of fewer 
fatalities), but high military expenditures by both sides could reflect an arms 
race between both countries. Dyadic education expenditures Ledupi and 
growth rates Gpi are significantly related to conflict mitigation, and the size of 
coefficients suggests that the potential of education spending in decreasing 
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hostilities is substantial. Democracy weakly decreases the severity of conflict, 
because of the low values of coefficients and their insignificance in certain 
cases. 
 
Table 2 also show that most proxies of multilateral trade (the two countries 
trade with the world) are negatively related with conflict and the relationship is 
significant. The coefficients can be shown to be greater than when individual 
multilateral trade is included.5 Another interesting observation which can be 
made from Table 2 is that coefficient for Xmpi is much smaller than 
coefficients on Xmip where in the later variable, Indian trade with rest of the 
world comes in the numerator, while in former case Pakistan’s trade with rest 
of the world is present in the numerator. One explanation for higher 
coefficients of Xmip is that Indian integration with rest of the world would 
matter more in determining the fall in hostilities in comparison to Pakistan’s 
integration with rest of the world. This may also mean that traditional 
closeness of Indian economy may form such political atmosphere where costs 
of peace were higher than benefits and as India opens up further, especially 
after 1990s, the costs of peace with Pakistan have been falling. Again this 
result is accordance to our theoretical model. Please note that costs of peace 
would also fall for Pakistan if it integrates further with rest of the world 
including India, but at a much slower rate than India. Within the trading sector, 
it is the exporting sector for both Pakistan and India which has been closely 
related with conflict mitigation and in contrast to Lxpi, coefficients on Lmpi 
show that rising imports do not abate conflict significantly. The results for 
military burden, education expenditure, economic performance and 
democracy remain unchanged for all the specifications.  
 
 
Figure 5: Fatality Score between India and Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5
 The results can be provided on request, and the nature of the results remains unchanged.   
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What would be the impact of a 100 percent increase in bilateral trade or 
multilateral trade on conflict (fatalities)? If multilateral trade or bilateral trade 
doubles, the coefficients in tables 2 and 3 reveal that fatalities would decrease 
by at least 200 percent (2 points) in case of multilateral trade and only 20 
percent (less than a half point) in case of bilateral trade. This means if Fatal 
has scored 5, and trade with rest of the world doubles, it will go down to score 
3. Generally, Fatal has taken up score of 3 or 2 (see figure 5 below), which 
means usually battle deaths have been either 26-100 deaths in case of score 
2 or 101-250 deaths in case of score 3. With high coefficients of multilateral 
trade in reducing fatal, one may confer that traditionally multilateral trade 
(relationship with outside world) have been playing a key role to not only 
contain fatalities but also the possibility of out right war between India and 
Pakistan. In contrast, bilateral trade has a much smaller effect on containing 
fatalities and thus currently plays a very limited role in conflict mitigation 
between India and Pakistan.  
Though Fatal is the preferred proxy and Volfatal is the second close one for 
conflict, Dur (Days of conflict), Hiact (Higest Action in disputes) and Hstlev 
(Annual Hostility Levels) are also useful proxies. They capture the severity of 
conflict with different angles, and would act as robustness tests for the results 
on Fatal as well as serves for the statistical validity of the larger model. 
Furthermore, utilizing more proxies of conflict provides better insight into the 
nature of conflict, especially when causality tests are undertaken. Remember, 
Causality tests would show which measures of conflict would have an effect if 
any on our endogenous independent variables (i.e, military burdern, bilateral 
or multilateral trade). The results based on Volfatal, Cnfpi, Dur, Hstlvl and 
Hiact are reported in Table 3. They confirm the validity of all the 5 hypotheses 
proposed at start of our empirical section, and the preceding theoretical 
analysis. More trade, increased education expenditure, higher GDP per capita 
growth rates, a greater democratic orientation, all exert downward pressure on 
conflict, as all of these variables are significant in most cases, and always 
carry the right signs. A comparison of coefficients suggests that multilateral 
trade with the world has by far the most dominant effect on conflict mitigation 
than any other variable. Note that in Table 3 we only consider multilateral 
trade, and not bilateral India-Pakistan trade.6 Education spending comes 
second in its effectiveness in enhancing peace. The results in Table 3 also 
show that annual battle deaths, severity of conflict, duration of escalation, 
hostility levels and highest hostility level decrease when both countries score 
high on democracy. Again, persistently low values taken by democracy means 
that political orientation plays a less prominent role in explaining the severity 
of dispute or levels of escalation. The two countries entered into an outright 
war even when both were democracies. The ‘Kargil’ war of 1999 is the case in 
point. In addition to Milbrd1 we have also utilized two more proxies of military 
burden introduced in earlier section on data definitions: As expected Lmilbrd2 
(when Pakistan’s military spending is in the numerator of two countries  
                                                
6
 Space constraints prevent us from reporting all our findings, but coefficients on bilateral 
trade are consistently smaller than comparable coefficients on multilateral trade.  
Table 3: VAR Regression results for Various Measures of Conflict 
                                                                         VAR Regression Equations under Multiple Specifications for Conflict and Military Burden  
Variables Volfatal Cnfpi Dur Hstlvl Hiact 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)   (1)  (2) (3)   (1)  (2) (3)   (1)  (2) (3)   (1)  (2) (3) 
Trade ª 
               
Lxpi (1) 
-10996*** -9971*** -6662*** -2.60*** -2.48*** -1.22* -451.4** -413.0** -182.81 -6.81*** -6.60*** -4.07** -25.75** -25.32*** -16.08* 
Military 
Burden                    
Lmilbrd1 (1) 
  3255*   0.31   -55.94   0.97   4.47 
Lmilbrd2 (6) 8276***   2.91***   604.72***   5.33*   19.09   
Lmilbrd3(6) 
 -3352**   -1.46***   -283.85**   -2.68*   -9.98  
Social 
Development                
Ledupi (2) 
-397.02 -435.58 -6011.6** -0.74* -0.69 -1.48 -146.53 -130.7 -180.69 -1.56 -1.47 -3.34 -9.09* -8.75* -17.08 
Economic 
Growth                
Gpi (1) 
-517.07*** -524.78*** -554.46*** -0.86** -0.084* -0.09** 4.89 4.97 3.63 -0.25* -0.25* -0.26* -1.28** -1.26** -1.38* 
Exogenous 
Variables                
Demopi (8) 1.36 1.06 0.06 -0.001* -0.001* -0.002* -0.336* -0.342* -0.372* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
Poppi (11) 36.38* 34.66* 71.54*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 3.531* 3.209* 4.248* 0.051** 0.048** 0.058** 0.253*** 0.247*** 0.295*** 
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
R2 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.51 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.37 
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) 
-***, ** and * shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level respectively 
- VAR(p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan & Quinn 
information criterion (HQIC), 
- ª Regressions for Bilateral trade (tpitp) are also undertaken and Tpitp enters the Conflict equation (8)  with a negative sign confirming positive role of trade between Pakistan and India in conflict 
mitigation or vice versa.  
 
 
relative military expenditure) is positively related with conflict and Lmilbrd3 (India 
on the numerator of relative military spending) is negatively related with conflict. 
This may indicate that any increase in military expenditure by Pakistan compared 
to India will be correlated with higher conflict. Indian military efforts are also 
directed to its civil wars and security concerns with other states, and thus in case 
of Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd3, the explanatory power may come from Pakistan’s 
military expenditure.   
We ran Granger causality tests for each VAR specification. A summary of 
Granger causality tests are provided in Table 4 for all endogenous regressors of 
conflict, and where there is an instance of reverse causality it is noted. The 
results in Table 4 show that all regressors, except imports Granger cause conflict 
while the nature of the relationship (+ or -) has been provided in tables 2 and 3.   
We also witness some instances of reverse causality, and these require some 
elaboration. The reverse causality in the India-Pakistan bilateral trade measures 
show that low levels of trade are also an outcome of India-Pakistan conflict which 
has spanned more than 50 years. Any decrease in hostility levels would also 
exert a positive effect on bilateral trade which would create fertile grounds for 
dispute resolution. Reuveny & Kang (1998) also found many instances of reverse 
causality between conflict and bilateral trade, when they applied Granger 
causality tests to trade and conflict between 16 dyads. In the India-Pakistan case 
they found that conflict Granger causes bilateral trade (with fairly short lags) and 
not vice-versa, unlike our findings of reverse causality. Our data set, however, 
extends to a longer period compared to Reuveny & Kang (1998), as it starts at an 
earlier period and ends at a later date when trade was greater.  The presence of 
reverse causality in average military spending is also not a surprise. This means 
that India-Pakistan conflict is also a significant cause of historically high military 
expenditures between both countries. Reduction of hostilities would thus 
favourably affect the military burden in both countries, and both India and 
Pakistan would have more resources to channel towards its development and 
poverty reduction strategies. The greater allocation of funds for defense due to 
ongoing conflict, may also strangle development spending. The reverse causality 
from conflict to education expenditure could explain this process. Reverse 
causality between conflict measures and proxies of education expenditure 
highlight the resource constraints faced by both sides due to their rivalry where 
funds allocated to defense seems to crowd out public investment in development 
sector. We also find that there is reverse causality between Lxpi and Hstslvl and 
Hiact. This result highlights the economic implications of conflict. If hostility levels 
rise and conflict moves closer to outright war, it will diminish the export capability 
with rest of the world for both countries. This will have negative effects on growth 
potentials also. 
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Table 4. Granger Causality Wald Tests 
Direction of Causality  Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC 
FatalTpitp →  (√)*** (√)* HstlvlLmilbrd →2  (√)* × 
FatalXmpi →  (√)** × HiactLmilbrd →2  × × 
FatalXmip →  (√)*** × DurLmilbrd →3  (√)* × 
FatalLxpi →  (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd →3  × × 
VolfatalLxpi →  (√)*** × FatalLmilbrd →3  (√)*** × 
CnfpiLxpi →  (√)*** × VolfatalLmilbrd →3  (√)*** × 
DurLxpi →  (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd →3  (√)*** × 
HstlvlLxpi →  (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLmilbrd →3  (√)** × 
HiactLxpi →  (√)** (√)* FatalGpi →  (√)*** × 
FatalLmpi →   × × VolfatalGpi →  (√)*** × 
FatalLmilbrd →1  (√)*** (√)*** CnfpiGpi →  (√)*** × 
VolfatalLmilbrd →1  (√)*** (√)* DurGpi →  (√)*** × 
CnfpiLmilbrd →1  × (√)* HstlvlGpi →  (√)* × 
DurLmilbrd →1  × (√)*** HiactGpi →  (√)* × 
HstlvlLmilbrd →1  × (√)* FatalLedupi →  (√)*** (√)*** 
HiactLmilbrd →1  × (√)*** VolfatalLedupi →  (√)*** × 
FatalLmilbrd →2  (√)*** × CnfpiLedupi →  (√)* (√)* 
VolfatalLmilbrd →2  (√)*** × DurLedupi →  (√)*** (√)*** 
CnfpiLmilbrd →2  (√)*** × HstlvlLedupi →  × (√)*** 
DurLmilbrd →2  (√)*** × HiactLedupi →  (√)* (√)** 
-***, ** and * shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level respectively, RC stands for reverse causation, √ means causes 
and × means not causes; For the nature of relationships (+ or -) between all endogenous dependent and endogenous 
independent variables covered above, please consult table 2 and 3: Causality tests are based on VAR regressions 
presented in these tables.  
 
Table 4, also high-light dynamics of military burden in India and Pakistan and 
nature of conflict. For example, if conflict lasts for more days, or hostilities rise or 
severity of action (i.e., in extreme case of out right war) rise between both 
parties, all would have a significant and positive shock on military expenditures in 
India and Pakistan as there is a presence of reverse causality between Lmilbrd1 
and these measure of conflict but no presence of causality. This means that arms 
race between India and Pakistan would not lead to rise in hostilities, neither 
increase the yearly duration of the conflict or lead to highest action (out-right 
war). This is an important result suggesting that higher military expenditures by 
both sides also have a deterrent effect on conflict, but if fatalities in the conflict 
rise, it will put a positive pressure on other measures of conflict, which in turn 
have positive shock on the arms race because we also find in table 4 that 
Lmilbrd1, in presence of reverse causation, appears to also positively and 
significantly cause Fatal or Volfatal. In contrast, Lmildbrd2 and Lmilbrd3, which 
are dynamic interactions of Indian and Pakistani military expenditures, 
significantly cause conflict while there is no reverse causation. This points out 
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towards the prevalent mistrust between both parties and the reason behind the 
arms race, where Pakistan’s military expenditure is more sensitively related with 
conflict than the Indian military expenditure. Though, Pakistan may see its rise in 
military expenditure as deterrence to match Indian military expenditure, it would 
in effect has a positive effect on conflict as this would not only sustain hostilities 
between both parties at higher levels of severity but also the duration of the 
conflict on average would rise. Economic growth Granger causes conflict, and 
the relationship is negative. The growth patterns of both countries are, however, 
independent of conflict as far as reverse causality is concerned, which is an 
important finding. The relationship is highly significant at a 1% level in all the 
observed instances of Table 4. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conflict between India and Pakistan has significantly hampered bilateral trade 
between the two nations. However, we also find that the converse is also true; 
more trade between India and Pakistan decreases conflict and any measures to 
improve bilateral trade will be a considerable confidence building measure. A 
regional trade agreement along the lines of a South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) has a potential for the improvement of relations between India and 
Pakistan on a long-term basis. This might even lead to indirect networking 
benefits (or getting to know each other) that promotes peace, as indicated by 
Dorussen & Ward (2008). Pakistan and India’s general degree of openness to 
world (and not bilateral) trade is, however, the dominant economic factor in 
conflict resolution. This echoes, McDonald’s (2004) finding that generally freer 
trade, not just trade interdependence facilitates peace, as well as Dorussen & 
Ward (2009) suggestion that increased multilateral trade may increase mutual 
interdependence, and the indirect costs of bilateral hostility driven trade 
disruption. 
Some of our results may appear to suggest that Pakistan’s relative military 
expenditure is conflict enhancing, whereas Indian relative military expenditure 
has a deterrent effect on conflict. This result, however, needs to be interpreted 
with caution. It does not necessarily mean that Pakistan is the principal actor 
initiating inter-state conflict with India. Rather it means that India, the regional 
hegemon, has other domestic and international concerns to which its defense 
spending is targeted, besides its disputes with Pakistan. Indeed, there is some 
reverse causality between some of the military proxies and conflict suggesting 
that Pakistan’s military build ups may be more reactive. Overall military 
expenditures are still at high levels in both countries, diverting scarce resources 
away from development spending, such as on education and poverty reduction. 
Education spending is good for both peace and economic progress.  
In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy between pairs of nation should 
reduce inter-state hostility according to the purer form of the Kantian liberal 
peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace 
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initiatives, it should be remembered, are not the sole prerogative of democracies; 
they can also be made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic out 
of economic self-interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions 
on many disputed issues with India. Our findings, however, veer towards the 
more economic or capitalist versions of the liberal peace hypothesis. Economic 
progress and poverty reduction combined with greater openness to international 
trade in general are more significant drivers of peace between nations like India 
and Pakistan, rather than the independent contribution of a common democratic 
polity. There may be the indirect pacific effects of greater globalization as 
emphasized by Dorussen & Ward (2009). In many ways, our results for an 
individual dyad echo Polcahek’s (1997) work across several dyads, where it is 
argued that democracies cooperate not because they have common political 
systems, but because their economies are intricately and intensively 
interdependent. As pointed by Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of 
economic development that the contribution of common democratic values to 
peace becomes more salient. Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where 
poverty is acute and endemic, even in ostensible democracies such as India. In 
the final analysis, it may be that true democracy itself is an endogenous by-
product of increased general prosperity, as suggested nearly half a century ago 
by Lipset (1960).  
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